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ABSTRACT 
 
Several studies have demonstrated a gap in political support between electoral winners and losers. 
This research has generated a large stock of knowledge about the causes and effects of this winner-
loser gap. Due to the use of cross-section survey data, however, we know little about the consisten-
cy of the winner-loser gap over time. Drawing on a unique Swedish panel survey this study investi-
gates the stability of the winner-loser gap among Swedish voters over an electoral cycle. The anal-
yses demonstrate a substantial consistency of the gap over time also when controlling for other 
determinants. The winner-loser gap seems to be a stable phenomenon rather than a short-lived 
election effect. The results are robust to different specifications and statistical techniques. 
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Introduction 
One of the most established empirical findings from research on political support during the last 
two decades is that people who has casted a vote for a party ending up as the winner or in a win-
ning coalition tends to report higher levels of political support than those voting for a losing party. 
This winner/loser-gap has been demonstrated in a wide variety of democracies displaying differ-
ences in terms of economic development, institutional arrangements, and democratic stability, both 
in terms of level and longevity of democracy (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson et al. 2005; 
Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Bernauer and Vatter 2012; Blais and Gélineau 2007; Curini et al. 
2012; Esaiasson 2011; Moehler 2009; Campbell 2013; Chang et al. 2014). 
 
Most studies concerned with the winner-loser gap have focused on its consequences for different di-
mensions of political support. The fact that winners and losers all around the globe perceive the 
functioning of the democratic political system differently has been demonstrated in several studies. 
Although recent research has produced a substantial stock of knowledge about the consequences of 
being a loser or a winner there is one aspect of this issue that to a large extent has been overlooked 
in earlier research. We do not know much about dynamics of the winner-loser gap in political sup-
port. If losing has a negative effect on political support, what happens to this effect over time? Is 
the winner-loser gap a consistent political phenomenon with long-term effects or is it no more than 
a short-term emotionally driven election effect which will disappear as the electoral cycle rolls on?  
 
This is the main question we set out to investigate in this paper. By taking advantage of unique data 
from a citizen panel this paper investigates the consistency of the winner-loser effect in Sweden 
over a period of almost four years. Since earlier research has – almost without exceptions – relied 
on pooled cross-sectional surveys covering different individuals at different points in time, we be-
lieve that both the analytical opportunities provided by the data and the results of the analyses make 
for an important contribution to the research on the dynamics of the winner-loser gap.  
 
The paper is structured in the following way. We start out with a presentation of earlier research on 
the of the winner-loser gap and present the hypotheses that will guide the empirical analysis. In the 
second section we present the data used in the empirical analyses. The third section consists of the 
empirical analysis. We start out by applying a broad comparative perspective before zooming in on 
the dynamics and characteristics of the winner-loser gap in Sweden from the general election in 
2010 to the spring 2014. The last section presents concluding remarks.  
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The winner-loser gap in political support 
 
The issue of how those on the losing side perceive the political system is central to democracy. In 
all democracies elections produces political losers, both when it comes to being represented in the 
political system and in the implementation of public policy. For democratic legitimacy, the way 
people react to political loss is critical (Anderson et al. 2005, 6; Esaiasson 2011). It is, important 
that, at least some, losers are supportive of the general performance of the democratic political 
system. Without broad support from winners and losers, the legitimacy of the system as such as well 
as for the decisions made might be threatened.  
 
Much interest has been directed towards the relationship between electoral outcomes and political 
support on the individual level. Several studies have shown that being a political winner (in the 
sense of having cast a vote for a party that ends up on the winning side in the election) significantly 
increases the likelihood of being satisfied with the functioning of the political system, and vice versa 
for those that are losers. In the literature the winner/loser issue has been subject to different elabo-
rations since it has been assumed that the effect of being a loser/winner has both different causes 
and consequences in different political contexts.  
 
Earlier research has investigated issues such as different types of electoral systems (Anderson and 
Guillory 1997; Bernauer and Vatter 2012), the effect on trust (Anderson and LoTempio 2002; 
Holmberg 1999; Lühiste 2006), political efficacy (Anderson and Tverdova 2001), system legitimacy 
(Moehler 2009) and support for political reforms (Bowler and Donovan 2007). Others have inves-
tigated how the winner/loser effect is mediated by contextual and individual-level factors, such as 
election context (Banducci and Karp 2003; Craig et al. 2006, Esaiasson 2011), bureaucratic quality 
(Anderson and Tverdova 2003), policy congruence between parties and voters (Curini et al. 2012) 
and level of democratic experience (Chang et al. 2014; Anderson et al. 2005). Thus, the dominant 
research agenda has been to assess the effects of the winner-loser gap on political support – most 
frequently satisfaction with democracy – and investigating variables that may have a mediating im-
pact on this effect. Most often this has been done by utilizing national and cross-national opinion 
polls conducted before and after elections. As a consequence we know a lot about the differences 
in support and trust between winners and losers at certain points in time and in different types of 
democracies. We also know a great deal about how these differences are mediated by institutional 
arrangements and individual characteristics.  
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The dynamics of the winner-loser gap 
 
Since most studies have utilized cross-sectional data and compared winners and losers shortly after 
elections, we cannot be certain about the assumption that winning or losing actually generates satis-
faction or dissatisfaction with democracy. Using cross-sectional data the best we can do is to assess 
the aggregated gap in support between winners and losers and to observe if this gap is present be-
fore and after the election (thus comparing winner-loser gaps consisting of different samples and 
individuals).  
 
The few studies that have taken an interest in the dynamics of the winner-loser gap have ap-
proached the issue from different viewpoints. Drawing on a series of Eurobarometer (EB) surveys of 
Britain, Germany and Spain, Anderson et al. (2005) examine the difference in satisfaction with de-
mocracy over time. Their analysis shows that while there is substantial variation between countries 
and over time, the winner-loser gap in satisfaction with democracy seems to persist over long peri-
ods of time. Thus, they argue that the experience of losing is not a temporary disappointment with 
the election outcome but appears to be a lasting aspect of how voters regard the functioning of the 
democratic system.  
 
It has also been shown that losing repeatedly further decreases political support among losers. An-
derson and colleagues find a difference between first and second election losses on the one hand 
and subsequent ones on the other. The decline in support is less substantial after the first and sec-
ond election but becomes more pronounced in subsequent elections, suggesting that losing signifi-
cantly affects political support after the second electoral loss in a row (Anderson et al. 2005). Also, 
in relation to the dynamics of the winner-loser gap, Blais and Gélineau (2007) use the Canadian 
federal election panel study to show that eventual winners were already more satisfied with the way 
democracy works than the eventual losers during the electoral campaign, i.e. before the election 
took place. Moreover, they find a general boost in satisfaction after the election among both win-
ners and losers (and non-voters). However, this positive effect is greater among winners. 
 
In a recent article, Curini et al. (2012) investigate the interplay between past experience of winning 
and voters’ policy preferences and satisfaction with democracy. The results show that winning al-
ways has a positive effect on support, but also that winning either in the recent past or in the pre-
sent produces a comparable effect. And, interestingly, for repeated winners support only increases 
if there is a close match between their own policy positions and those of the government. If not, 
the effect of winning disappears. However, in a study of six new democracies experiencing gov-
ernment turnover in the most recent election Chang et al. show that what is most important in 
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terms of satisfaction with democracy is whether an individual has any experience from being a win-
ner or if she is a two-time loser. Voters who have lost two consecutive elections show significantly 
lower levels of SWD compared to voters who have won in at least one election. Thus, losers are 
not necessarily less satisfied when taking into account how their winner-loser status evolved over 
time. Moreover, expanding their analysis to a sample of both new and old democracies they show 
that the negative effect of being a ‘constant’ loser is only observable in young democracies (Chang 
et al. 2014).  
 
Thus, taken together, the empirical studies employing a dynamic perspective on the winner-loser 
gap and political support suggest – on the most basic level – that there is a positive (negative) effect 
on political support of being an electoral winner (loser), but also that there is a dynamic pattern 
when it comes to the number of times a voter is a winner (or a loser) and also that policy prefer-
ences seem to exercise a mediating effect on the gap in satisfaction between winners and losers. 
And, most importantly for our purposes, the presented evidence suggests that winning and losing 
has both short-term and long-term effects on satisfaction with democracy.  
 
However, some critical voices argue that a winner-loser gap can be observed in most countries 
because surveys of different aspects of political support are typically carried out shortly after an 
election, when losers might be less satisfied with the way democracy works in their country as a 
short-term effect of electoral loss, i.e. that the winner-loser effect is ‘entirely a fleeting emotional 
one. In the long run, this emotionally-driven dip in satisfaction should level out’ (Cutler et al. 2013, 
14). This is an interesting statement, but the merit of the argument has to be put to test by con-
fronting it with empirical data. Nonetheless, the argument does indeed illustrate the need for a dy-
namic perspective when empirically investigating the winner-loser gap. Thus, taking stock of the 
research on the winner-loser gap two main hypotheses about the winner-loser gap can be singled 
out: 
 
H1 (The stability hypothesis): Experience of losing is not a temporary disappointment with the 
election outcome, but a lasting aspect of how voters regard the functioning of the democratic system and the win-
ner-loser gap will thus be stable over time. 
 
H2 (The electoral effect hypothesis): The frequently observed winner-loser gap is an emotionally 
driven short-time effect of experiencing electoral loss and the negative effect levels out over the course of the 
electoral cycle. 
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Data, research design and operationalization  
 
In this study we rely on four different data sources. We start out by depicting the winner-loser gap 
in general across a wide range of democratic countries using pooled data from the Comparative Study 
of Electoral Systems (CSES, modules 1, 2 and 3).1 From these election studies we have selected the last 
election study from all countries classified as free by Freedom House.2 After a comparative view on 
the winner-loser gap we zoom in on one of these countries, namely Sweden. The reason for choos-
ing Sweden as our case is first and foremost the availability of a unique panel study. However, Swe-
den could also be regarded a ‘critical case’ since levels of political support and trust are at a compar-
atively high level and even electoral losers express relatively high levels of support.  
 
At the University of Gothenburg, an Internet based Election Campaign Panel has been conducted 
since the elections of 2002. In some of the analyses in this paper we will use the election campaign 
panel for the election of 2010. After the recruitment of this panel, the respondents were asked to 
continue their participation in a repeated citizen panel, and to this date 8 larger rounds of the Citizen 
Panel have been carried out. The main part of the recruitment to the Citizen Panel was initiated 
during the election campaign of the Swedish general election in 2010 and was mainly done through 
Internet advertising on the websites of newspapers, and on Twitter, Facebook and blogs. In con-
nection to the Swedish parliament election panel members were also recruited through party simu-
lations on both Facebook and the election site of Swedish public radio. Recruitment has also oc-
cured in connection with Gothenburg’s Science festival, exhibitions, and through sports associa-
tions etc.  
 
This implies that the Citizen Panel is consisting of self-recruited participants who are not repre-
sentative for the Swedish population as a whole. The data are therefore mainly used for randomized 
survey experiments or panel data collection, where focus is on changes over time in certain groups 
or individuals. Therefore, the self-recruited part of the Citizen Panel is an important complement to 
the conventional nation-wide representative surveys that are conducted at University of Gothen-
burg, such as for example the surveys by the SOM-institute.3 In order to test the face-validity of 
these panel data, we use a national representative survey from the SOM-institute – Riks-SOM 2010 
– conducted in the autumn of 2010, carried out at more or less the same time as the post-election 
campaign panel. In the survey carried out within the Citizen Panel there are a number of items that, 
with rare exceptions, are included in all surveys. Among these panel questions are questions of 
                                                     
1
 For data description and download see, www.cses.org. 
2
 See www.freedomhouse.org. 
3
 For details, see www.som.gu.se. 
  8 
institutional trust, satisfaction with democracy, political interest, interpersonal trust, as well as atti-
tudes towards political parties and political issues. Participation in the Citizen Panel is voluntary and 
the respondents are free to leave the panel at any time.4  
 
The first round of the Citizen Panel was launched in November 2010. Thereafter a new survey has 
been sent out twice a year, one in the spring (April-May) and one in the autumn (October-
November). This in turn implies that we have the opportunity to track the same individuals from 
the election campaign of 2010 to May 2014. For the panel analyses presented below we use a fully 
balanced panel (using list wise deletion), which leaves us with 695 respondents in total. Given that 
4358 respondents initially participated in the first panel step but only 695 respondents participates 
in all panel, gives a response-rate of 16 percent. This drop-out rate of course affects the composi-
tion of the panel. However, one should remember that the initial recruitment was based on a non-
representative opt-in sample.  
 
The dependent variable: Satisfaction with democracy 
 
In general, we set out to investigate how evaluations of the functioning of the political system are 
being affected by having cast a vote for the losing side in elections. In order to measure evaluations 
of the functioning of the political system, we follow the standard procedure in earlier research and 
use the ‘satisfaction with democracy’ indicator. Similar to most other surveys (e.g. Eurobarometer and 
the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) the particular question in the Citizen Panel asks the re-
spondents to what extent they are satisfied with the way democracy works. It is scaled from 1 (very 
dissatisfied) to 4 (very satisfied).5  We are aware of the fact that this is not in any way an unprob-
lematic indicator, as its meaning and measurement has been discussed and debated in the literature 
(Canache et al. 2001; Linde and Ekman 2003; Norris 2011). It is however the most frequently used 
item in earlier research on the winner-loser gap. Thus, using this item as our indicator of political 
support put us in a good position to generalize the results of our analysis to the broader field of 
research on different democracies.  
 
The issue of classifying winners and losers 
 
In order to investigate possible effects of being an electoral winner or loser we need individual level 
data on people’s voting behaviour. The panel surveys contain data on respondents’ vote in the last 
election. By matching this information with the parties that formed government after the 2010 
                                                     
4
 For more details about the information to panel members, see medborgarpanelen.gu.se. 
5
 The original scale in the questionnaire goes ‘very satisfied’ (1) to ‘very dissatisfied’ (4). 
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election we are able to identify electoral winners and losers. The 2010 election resulted in a pro-
longed mandate to govern for the centre-right government alliance consisting of the conservative 
Moderate Party (Moderaterna), the Liberal People’s Party (Folkpartiet), the Centre Party (Centerpartiet) 
and the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna). Voters stating that they cast their vote for any of 
these parties in the election are thus defined as winners.  
 
Defining losers in a democracy with proportional representation such as Sweden might be some-
what complicated. One strategy is to classify all other voters – regardless of which non-government 
party they cast their vote for – as losers. Another is to include only those who voted for a party that 
ended up in parliament. In this study we opt for the latter strategy. Hence, we leave out the voters 
casting their vote for small anti-system parties and parties that have never been represented in par-
liament (i.e. as part of the parliamentary opposition). However, this group is very small and the 
choice of strategy does not affect the results in any significant way. We thus define as losers those 
who state that voted for any of the four non-government parties in the Swedish parliament - the 
Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterna), the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet), the Green Party 
(Miljöpartiet) and the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna).  
 
Concerning the definition of losers, an interesting issue that has not received much attention in the 
literature is whether all losers lose equally much. In the Swedish case, it is not unlikely that people 
voting for the Swedish Democrats could to some extent perceive themselves as winners, since the 
party did their best election and gained parliamentary representation for the first time, although 
they became part of the opposition after the election. Thus, it is not totally unlikely that some losers 
feel like something like ‘relative winners’, i.e. contributing to a successful election result for the 
party they feel attached to, although not ending up in a government position. Moreover, the fact 
that there was no alternation in power after the 2010 election means that we are able to investigate 
both short- and long-term (at least the medium-term) consequences of being a winner or loser. 
Unfortunately, this also means that we are not able to study the effect of losers becoming winners 
after an election with a change in government.  
 
The winner-loser gap in a comparative perspective 
 
We start out the empirical analysis by employing a broad comparative perspective in order to inves-
tigate the general validity of the winner-loser gap hypothesis. Figure 1 presents data on electoral 
winners and losers and their average level of satisfaction with democracy in 28 countries included in 
the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. The countries represent a broad range of democracies 
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with varying characteristics, such as level of democratic consolidation, levels of political support 
and institutional arrangements.  
 
The countries are ordered by average level of public satisfaction with democracy. The bars illustrate 
the winner-loser gap, i.e. the difference in level of satisfaction between winners and losers. The dots 
indicate the average level of satisfaction of winners. There is a quite substantial variation among 
countries, both in terms of general level of satisfaction and in the size of the winner-loser gap. A 
first note that should be made is that in six countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, 
New Zealand and South Africa) losers actually display higher levels of satisfaction than the winners. 
However, in 22 out of 28 countries, the winners are more content with the way democracy works 
than the losers.  
 
Regarding levels of satisfaction in general there is a clear tendency that citizens in established de-
mocracies are on average more satisfied with the functioning of the democratic system than their 
counterparts in more recent democracies, and in particular in post-communist countries. On the 
right hand side of the figure we find mature democracies with the Scandinavian countries displaying 
the highest levels of political support.  
As shown in Figure 1, Swedish citizens are in general satisfied with the way democracy works, with 
an average level of satisfaction at 2.95 on the 1–4 scale. This corresponds very well with the general 
picture of Sweden as a country with comparatively very high levels of political support and trust 
(See Klingemann 1999; Norris 2011; Dahlberg et al. 2014). 
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FIGURE 1. SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS AMONG ELECTORAL WINNERS 
AND LOSERS IN 28 DEMOCRACIES  
 
Comment: Bars illustrate the average difference in satisfaction with democracies between winners and losers. The dots to the right 
of the bars indicate the average levels of satisfaction with democracy among winners. 
Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), modules 1-3. 
 
Interestingly for our purposes in this paper, the gap between winners and losers in terms of satis-
faction in Sweden is quite narrow, compared to most other countries. Sweden thus comes forward 
as a country with both high levels of general satisfaction with the way democracy works and where 
a majority of the losers also perceive the functioning of the system in a positive way. This makes 
Sweden a particularly interesting case to study when it comes to the dynamics of the winner-loser 
gap. If the gap is both present and stable during the course of the electoral cycle in an established 
democracy with high levels of support and a relatively small gap in support between winners and 
losers, the findings could probably be generalizable to other democracies. If the winner-loser gap 
on the other hand is diminishing over the electoral cycle, it will probably do so in other established 
democracies with strong political support and moderate gaps between winners and losers as well.  
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A dynamic investigation of the winner-loser gap among Swedish 
voters 
 
Earlier comparative studies using pooled cross-sectional data have pointed out that the difference 
in satisfaction with democracy among winners and losers seems to be quite stable over time. For 
example, Anderson and colleagues present a series of analyses indicating that although the level of 
satisfaction fluctuates substantially over time in the countries under analysis, supporters of the gov-
ernment consistently display significantly more positive evaluations of the performance of the polit-
ical system than do supporters of the opposition (although the magnitude of the gap is fluctuating 
substantially over time) (Anderson et al. 2005).  
 
However, without data on individual citizens’ perceptions over time we cannot be certain that the 
gap observed at the aggregate level also manifests itself on the individual level. That is, we cannot 
know whether the effect of winning/losing on satisfaction is stable over time when it comes to 
individual winners/losers. Only individual level panel data make it possible to investigate whether 
the gap is substantial and stable over time, as expected by our first hypothesis, or if the gap is actu-
ally a dip in satisfaction with democracy among losers which levels out as time passes over the elec-
toral cycle, as suggested by our second hypothesis.  
 
Figure 2 presents average levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works among electoral win-
ners and losers in Sweden at eight points in time – from after the election in 2010 to spring 2014 – 
for a period of almost four years, i.e. covering more or less a whole electoral cycle. Each point in 
time contains the same respondents.  
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FIGURE 2. SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS AMONG ELECTORAL WINNERS 
AND LOSERS 2010-2014 (CITIZEN PANEL) 
 
Comment: The number of respondents in the group voting for any of the winning parties is 302 and 354 in the group voting for 
losing parties. The between-group differences are significantly different from zero through all time points (p<.001).   
 
A simple inspection shows, as expected, that those who cast their votes on a party in government 
express higher levels of satisfaction than the losers. And – more interestingly for our purposes – the 
gap is more or less constant throughout the whole period. This is an interesting finding, which 
confirms the clear patterns of sustainability in the winner-loser gap over time found in earlier re-
search based on pooled cross-sectional data. Thus, at this point we find no support for the ‘elec-
toral effect hypothesis’ stating that the relative dissatisfaction of losers should be fading out over 
the course of the electoral cycle. Rather, the pattern over time is very consistent, particularly con-
cerning the losers, thus supporting the ‘stability hypothesis’.6  
 
Since the data we use were collected through a self-recruited web-panel the issue of representative-
ness is of course central. However, comparing the winner-loser gap between data taken from the 
national representative cross-sectional data collected by the SOM-institute during the autumn of 
2010 and the self-selected citizen panel shows substantial face validity in the sense that there is a 
significant difference between electoral winners and losers in the national representative SOM data 
as well. As shown in Figure 3, on average the winners and the losers in both samples are about 
equally satisfied with the working of democracy. The average level of satisfaction among the elec-
                                                     
6
 A winner-loser gap has also been observed when it comes to other objects of political support, such as political trust 
(see Anderson and LoTempio 2002 in the case of the US). This seems to be the case also in Sweden, at least when it 
comes to trust in politicians, with a significant gap between winners and losers throughout the period. The gap is how-
ever somewhat narrower than for SWD. 
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toral losers are, however, somewhat lower when measured in the citizen panel (2.64 compared to 
2.81 in the SOM data). From prior research we know that the respondents in the opt-in sample 
used in the citizen panel are on average more politically interested and ideologically more extreme, 
something that might explain the somewhat lower levels of satisfaction among the losers in the 
citizen panel (see Dahlberg et al. 2012). 
 
Nevertheless, the results from the SOM data illustrates that the non-representative citizen panel is 
not too skewed compared to the country representative data collected by SOM when it comes to 
levels of satisfaction with the working of democracy. A more detailed comparison of the Citizen 
Panel and the SOM data for all other variables used throughout this paper can be found in Appen-
dix 1. 
 
FIGURE 3. SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS AMONG ELECTORAL WINNERS 
AND LOSERS AUTUMN 2010 (CROSS-SECTIONAL REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF SWEDISH CITI-
ZENS) 
 
Source: Weibull et al. (2013) & Citizen Panel 
 
 
Winners, losers and Sweden Democrats 
 
After the 2010 election, the Sweden Democrats (SD) secured representation in the Swedish Riksdag 
for the first time after receiving 5.7 per cent of the votes. SD could be described as a populist anti-
immigration and anti-establishment party. Although they did not stand a chance to be included in a 
winning coalition, they did their best election so far, and it is not entirely clear what to expect when 
it comes to satisfaction with democracy among their supporters. Of course, the party’s image as an 
anti-system party could attract people who have already lost confidence in representative democra-
cy and the performance of the Swedish political system. From this perspective, SD voters would 
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still be ‘losers’. On the other hand, SD performed well in the election and reached parliamentary 
representation and increased their possibility to influence public policy for the first time in the par-
ty’s history. It is not unlikely that such an achievement could boost satisfaction with democracy, at 
least in the short-run after the election. In Figure 4 we take a closer look at levels of satisfaction for 
voters stating that they voted for the Swedish Democrats. These are plotted against the correspond-
ing levels for those voting for one of the parties in the government coalition (‘the Alliance’) and 
those voting for one of the ‘mainstream’ Red-Green opposition parties (Social Democrats, Green 
Party and Left Party). 
 
FIGURE 4. SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS AMONG ELECTORAL WINNERS, 
LOSERS AND THE SWEDEN DEMOCRATS 2010-2014 (CITIZEN PANEL) 
 
 
Comment: The number of respondents in the group voting for any of the winning parties is  302.In the group voting for losing 
parties they reaches 299 and for the Sweden Democrats 55 respondents. The between-group differences are significantly different 
from zero through all time points (p<.001).   
 
 
Not very surprisingly, SD voters are more dissatisfied than the others in general. There is an in-
crease in satisfaction among SD supporters from autumn 2010 to spring 2011, when average SWD 
reaches the highest recorded level (however, decreasing again after this). This might be an indica-
tion of a marginal post-election effect. However, there is no substantial variation over time and on 
average SD voters show a consistently lower level of SWD than the Red-Green losers and this pat-
tern is manifested throughout the measured period of time. Interestingly for the main purpose of 
this paper, even when sorting out SD voters, the gap between winners and ‘other losers’ is still 
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substantial over the whole period of time.  We now turn to a more thorough multilevel analysis of 
the winner-loser gap on the individual level. 
 
A multivariate analysis of the stability of the winner-loser gap 
 
Thus far, the descriptive data presented have clearly pointed in the direction of the ‘stability hy-
pothesis.’ We have seen that, on the aggregate, losers are significantly less satisfied with the way 
democracy works and that they continue to be so over time. In the following we will examine the 
stability of the winner-loser gap in a more systematic manner in order to rule out the possibility that 
the significant gap we find in the descriptive analyses is due to systematic differences among the 
groups of respondents, for example socio-economic status.  
 
We start out by investigating the difference in satisfaction with democracy between winners and 
losers in Sweden at the individual level using the representative Riks-SOM data from 2010 in order 
to obtain a reliable benchmark for comparisons with the opt-in sample used in the Citizen Panel. 
The dependent variable is satisfaction with democracy. The independent variable of main interest is 
status as winner or loser. We use a dichotomous variable with the values 1 (loser) and 0 (winner). 
The first regression model in Table 1 shows that being a loser significantly decreases the likelihood 
of being satisfied with the way democracy works. Model 2 introduces a number of control variables 
that in other studies have been shown to be important determinants of SWD (Doorenspleet 2012; 
Dahlberg et al. 2014; Anderson and Guillory 1997).  
 
Not surprisingly, trust in politicians – which arguably is closely related to satisfaction with democ-
racy – comes out as highly important. When introducing the battery of control variables, the effect 
of losing on SWD drops somewhat, but is still statistically significant at the 99 per cent level. To 
control for the possibility that the significant gap between winners and losers is driven by the lower 
levels of SWD among supporter of the Sweden Democrats compared to other losers (Figure 4), we 
introduce a control for SD vote in model 3. As expected, individuals voting for SD are much less 
likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works. Nevertheless, the coefficient for ‘loser’ retains 
its high level of statistical significance although it becomes somewhat smaller.  
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TABLE 1: THE WINNER-LOSER GAP AND SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY (SOM CROSS-
SECTION) 
 
 Satisfaction with Democracy Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    Loser -0.396*** -0.211*** -0.168*** 
 
(0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
Trust in politicians 
 
0.264*** 0.254*** 
  
(0.021) (0.020) 
Left-right extremism 
 
0.002 0.002 
  
(0.002) (0.002) 
Political interest 
 
0.046* 0.054** 
  
(0.025) (0.025) 
Gender 
 
0.061* 0.064* 
  
(0.036) (0.035) 
Age 
 
0.020* 0.017 
  
(0.010) (0.010) 
Education (eight categories) 
 
0.034*** 0.028*** 
  
(0.011) (0.011) 
Employment (1=employed) 
 
0.072* 0.074* 
  
(0.041) (0.040) 
Voted for SD 
  
-0.529*** 
   
(0.088) 
Intercept 3.167*** 3.526*** 3.560*** 
 
(0.026) (0.145) (0.143) 
Observations 1,162 1,162 1,162 
R-squared 0.084 0.229 0.253 
 
Source: Weibull et al. (2013), Riks-SOM 2010.  
Note: OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Trust in politicians is a survey question about trust at the national level and is measured on a five-
point scale where 1=low trust, 3=neither high not low, and 5=high trust. Left-right extremism is 
operationalized as the absolute distance from the midpoint towards the end-points on a five point 
left-right scale. Political interest is based on an item coded 1=not interested at all, 2=not very inter-
ested, 3=somewhat interested and 4=very interested . Gender is coded as 1 for women and 2 for 
men. Age is based on seven categories: (18/21=1) (22/30=2) (31/40=3) (41/50=4) (51/60=5) 
(61/70=6) (71/max=7). Education is based on a question with eight categories where higher num-
bers indicate higher levels education. Employment enters as a dichotomy where 0=unemployed and 
1=employed. Voted for the Sweden Democrats is coded 1 for SD vote and 0 for others. 
 
In Table 2 we are again turning to the citizen panel, this time focusing on the individual level in 
order to explain the dynamics in political support among electoral winners and losers over time. 
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Model 1 shows the results from a mixed random effect model where we interact winner/loser sta-
tus with time in order to evaluate our initial hypotheses. More specifically, we are here applying a 
growth curve model with random intercepts and slopes where the latter simply allows the individu-
als to have different rates of growth.  
 
TABLE 2. THE WINNER LOSER GAP AND SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY (MIXED MODELS 
WITH RANDOM INTERCEPTS AND SLOPES) 
 
Satisfaction with Democracy Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Electoral loser Electoral loser Electoral loser Dynamic loser 
Loser -0.583*** -0.455*** -0.356*** -0.256*** 
 
(0.057) (0.050) (0.049) (0.044) 
Time -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.003 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Loser*Time 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Trust in politicians 
 
0.320*** 0.303*** 0.378*** 
  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018) 
Left-right extremism 
 
-0.002 -0.014 -0.011 
  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) 
Political interest 
 
0.140*** 0.105*** 0.146*** 
  
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035) 
Gender 
 
0.000 0.051 0.073* 
  
(0.043) (0.041) (0.040) 
Age 
 
0.002 0.001 0.001 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education (eight categories) 
 
0.059*** 0.045*** 0.048*** 
  
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Employment (1=employed) 
 
0.025 0.029 0.019 
  
(0.044) (0.042) (0.041) 
Voted for Sweden Democrats 
  
-0.675*** -0.277*** 
   
(0.072) (0.051) 
Intercept 3.264*** 1.671*** 1.812*** 1.367*** 
 
(0.042) (0.190) (0.181) (0.179) 
var(time) .002 .001 .001 .001 
var(intercept) .352 .222 .200 .189 
cov(time,intercept) -.005 -.005 -.006 -.005 
var(e) .177 .175 .175 .187 
Log likelihood  -3787.723 -3592.7797 -3550.4797 -2555.5647 
Observations 5,040 5,040 5,040 3,322 
Number of groups 639 639 639 659 
Time points 8 8 8 8 
 
Source: Citizen Panel 2010-2014.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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For coding rules, see Table 1. In the first three models the winner-loser variable is based on which 
party one voted for in the parliamentary election 2010, which means that it enters as a dichoto-
mized over time constant variable. In the fourth model we are instead using a party preference 
survey item asked at each time-point that makes it dynamic so a voter that is changing his/her party 
preference from an opposition party to a governmental party is thus coded as a winner at that spe-
cific time-point. There is one drawback in this respect and that is that for the first four time points 
the survey question asked about which party one would vote for if there was an election today (for 
the second time-point the question is missing and is extrapolated from the first and the third panel 
steps). From time-point three and onwards the survey question was altered and asks for which par-
ty one intend to vote for in the upcoming election in 2014. Of course, these questions are not iden-
tical which is unfortunate but still the only thing we have. One could however argue that vote in-
tention in the future is a good proxy for one’s political preferences today (the correlation between 
the today vote intention at time-point 4 and the prospective vote intention in panel step five is .64). 
 
Remember that according to our first hypothesis the winner-loser gap should be a lasting aspect of how 
voters regard the functioning of the democratic system and the winner loser gap will thus be stable over time, while 
our alternative hypothesis argues that the winner-loser gap is an emotionally driven short-time effect of 
experiencing electoral loss. If latter hypothesis is correct we should expect a significant effect of the 
interaction term between the winner-loser-dummy and the time component. If, on the other hand, 
the first hypothesis is correct, there should be no such effect because the gap is not getting narrow-
er (widened) over time.  
 
The results in Model 1 in Table 2 confirm the pattern found in the descriptive data (Figure 2), 
namely that the winner-loser gap is not decreasing over time but seems to be a relatively stable 
phenomenon. However, also here we might run the risk in that the winner-loser effect actually is a 
result of socio-economical differences where we find less politically interested, low educated blue-
collar workers with initial lower levels of SWD on the losing side and more interested and highly 
educated, middle class citizens with higher levels of SWD among the winners. For this reason we 
are in Model 2 controlling for political trust, political interest, ideological extremism, education, 
gender and employment. When these factors also are taken into account, the initial effect of being a 
loser of SWD among is somewhat dwarfed but the winner-loser gap is still both substantial and 
statistically significant. 
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Since we initially found substantially lower levels of satisfaction with democracy among those who 
voted for the Sweden Democrats, we have in Model 3 also included a dummy for the SD voters. 
The inclusion of this variable shows that the SD voters have a rather large impact on the average 
effect on SWD in the sample. We also find a small, on the marginal, significant decrease in general 
on SWD over time. However, the most interesting result is the fact that we do not obtain a signifi-
cant decrease in the winner-loser gap over time. The interaction between going from a ‘winner’ to a 
‘loser’ and time does not reach statistical significance in any of the models. The effect seems to be 
particularly stable through all models, which lends strong support to our first hypothesis. Taken 
together, this implies that losers in fact are equally dissatisfied throughout the electoral cycle while 
the significant over-time decrease in SWD in general implies that it is actually the winners that are 
becoming somewhat less satisfied as time goes by, although they are till significantly more satisfied 
than the losers.  
 
In the fourth model in Table 2, we are using a dynamic variable for winners and losers. Here we are 
using vote intention at each specific time-point. Theoretically, voting for a losing party in an elec-
tion may not automatically make one to a loser during the whole electoral cycle in a relative sense. 
We know from the voting studies literature that voters have become more and more likely to shift 
party preferences over time (Narud and Aalberg 1999) so shifts in preferences during the electoral 
cycle are not very unlikely. By using a dynamic variable we thus let the respondents to be able to 
shift from losers to winners in relative terms, which makes for an even stronger test of our hypoth-
eses. What occurs though is that although the initial effect of being a loser on satisfaction with the 
way democracy works drops somewhat it is still substantial and significant. Of greater importance is 
however the still insignificant interaction between time and winner-loser. This shows that the initial 
results still are stable and confirmed.    
 
This pattern appears clearly in figure 5 where the marginal effect of losing and winning on SWD 
over time is plotted. As can be seen the gap becomes somewhat narrower over time but when 
comparing the winner-loser gap at the earliest time-points with the later ones, the effect is far from 
cancelling out. In this respect, the results clearly point in favour of the ‘stability hypothesis’, indicat-
ing that the winner-loser gap, although it is relatively small, is something more than a short-time 
electoral effect. In the Swedish case, thus, the winner-loser gap shows considerably consistency 
over time.7 
                                                     
7
 In Appendix 4, Model 3 in Table 2 is estimated with alternative techniques (simple OLS with robust standard errors, 
random intercepts only, random intercepts and slopes and with a lagged dependent variable included; and finally as a 
multilevel ordinal logit). The results are in general robust and it does not seem to matter which estimation procedure is 
being used. However, when estimating a multi-level ordinal logit model, the interaction effect between winner-loser and 
time is significant on the marginal, which means that there is, on the .10-level, a significant decrease in SWD among the 
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FIGURE 5. MARGINAL EFFECT OF BEING WINNER/LOSER ON SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY 
OVER TIME 
 
Electoral losers Dynamic losers 
  
 
Comment: The marginal effects are based on Model 3 and 4 in Table 2. 
 
Ideally, when investigating the effect of voting for winning or losing parties on SWD we would 
have been better off if we had access to one or more pre-election measurements in order to be able 
to test the validity of the ‘electoral effect hypothesis’ in a more systematic manner. As discussed 
earlier, the respondents in the Citizen Panel were recruited before the national election in 2010 into 
a Campaign Panel, where the respondents in last survey were asked if they would like to continue to 
participate in a continuing Citizen Panel. The Campaign Panel did in fact include the question on 
satisfaction with democracy. Unfortunately, the Campaign Panel and the Citizen Panel differ in 
some important aspects, both in design and items included. 
 
These obstacles affect the comparability between surveys although the respondents are the same. 
The design-problem concerns in particular the fact that in the Campaign Panel the survey questions 
were randomized to the respondents in order to limit the length of the surveys. This in turn implies 
that only 209 of the respondents in the Citizen Panel received the SWD question in the pre-election 
surveys.8 When merging the Campaign and Citizen Panels, this implies that when using list-wise 
deletion it leaves us with 209 respondents (or actually 194 respondents due to missing data on some 
key variables). However, if we instead base the analyses on the Citizen Panel only, the same proce-
dure leaves us with 695 respondents (or actually 639 respondents due to missing data).  A second 
                                                                                                                                                           
electoral winners over time. This decrease is, however, not closing the gap between winners and losers during the 
electoral cycle.   
8
 The Citizen Panel, which was carried out a couple of months after the election, was not designed in this way. Instead, 
all respondents received all survey questions. 
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caveat to be made is that in the Campaign panel a seven-point scale was used for the SWD item 
while the Citizen Panel uses the standard four-category SWD item. In order to obtain comparability 
we have tried different strategies where we have recoded the seven-point SWD item into different 
versions of the four-point scale used in the Citizen panel but none of them were entirely satisfacto-
ry.9 We therefore decided to keep the analyses based on the Citizen Panel alone in the paper since 
our main interest is in the stability of the winner-loser gap and since the actual winner-loser effect in 
pre- and post-election studies is already well documented (Anderson et. al. 2005).  
 
As a compromise we have instead included the results from the combined panel datasets in Ap-
pendix 2. The models presented in the appendix are the same as in Table 2 with the difference that 
they are run on a merged dataset containing the pre-election measures, i.e. one additional panel step 
but containing only 194 respondents. The conclusion drawn from these analyses is that the results 
still are robust and highly comparable with the results in Table 2 above. The standard errors are of 
course much larger due to the limited amount of independent observations in the merged dataset 
but the winner-loser gap is both significant and stable over time. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This paper presents a first attempt to investigate the winner-loser gap in satisfaction with democra-
cy from a dynamic perspective. Focusing on the consistency of the gap over the course of an al-
most full electoral cycle in Sweden (autumn 2010 to spring 2014), two contradicting hypotheses are 
tested on data from the Swedish Citizen Panel. The analysis reveals a substantial consistency of the 
winner-loser gap throughout the whole time period under investigation. At all points in time, the 
group of electoral winners shows higher levels of political support than the losers, and the magni-
tude of the gap is surprisingly stable. The substantial gap in satisfaction between winners and losers 
is also evident when controlling for other possible explanatory factors in an individual level multi-
variate analysis.  
                                                     
9
 We have elaborated with multiple imputation and interpolation of values for the missing cases in the Campaign Panel. 
We tried different strategies but none of them delivered reliable results, or rather, the imputations were actually driving 
the results to an unreasonable extent when we compared it with the original smaller-N study. A problematic aspect of 
the imputation procedure in this respect is that since we are interested in the effect of the specific time-points, we need 
to impute the missing values with information from the valid cases at the very same time-point. The relatively small 
number of cases in this respect made it difficult to make more fine-grained predictions. This may however not be a 
problem per se but in this case we cannot be sure whether the differences are a result due to the imputations or of the 
different scales being used. The SWD measure in the Campaign Panel used, as mentioned, a seven point scale while 
the Citizen Panel presents the respondents with the more frequently used SWD item, which reads: ‘On the whole, are 
you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?’ 
This implies that the original measures are not fully comparable. In order to make it somehow comparable we have 
recoded the seven point scale into four categories, such as (1=1, 2/3=2, 4=., 5/6=3, 7=4) (results from the different 
coding rules can also be found in Appendix 3). 
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Thus, the data and our analyses lend strong support for the ‘stability hypothesis’. In Sweden, the 
experience of losing does not seem to be a temporary disappointment with the election outcome 
but a relatively long-lasting aspect of how voters regard the functioning of the democratic system. 
Nothing in our data speaks in favour of the ‘electoral effect hypothesis’, i.e. that the winner-loser 
gap is an emotionally driven short-time effect of experiencing electoral loss and that the drop in 
satisfaction should level out as time passes after an election. The individual-level analyses demon-
strate that the winner-loser gap in SWD is very stable over time, even when controlling for theoret-
ically relevant variables used to explain political support in earlier studies. This result is robust to 
alternative specifications using different statistical techniques. The present study thus adds new and 
important knowledge about the effects of experiencing electoral loss or victory, a theme empirically 
investigated in many studies covering a broad range of democracies. To our knowledge, however, 
this study is the first to investigate the dynamics of the winner-loser gap using panel data of this 
magnitude, featuring several surveys of the same individuals over the course of a whole electoral 
cycle. 
 
The robust results indicate that there are good reasons to believe that if this is the case in Sweden, 
which is a country with a comparatively small winner-loser gap and relatively high levels of support 
among losers, it is very likely that the same pattern would be found in other stable democracies 
where the difference in political support between winners and losers is more pronounced. The 
results are also interesting in relation to political legitimacy in a more general way. In Sweden, alt-
hough losers express lover levels of satisfaction with democracy than winners, they are nonetheless 
relatively content with the way democracy works. This means that the effect of experiencing elec-
toral loss in terms of lower levels of SWD does not, on average, seem to affect system legitimacy in 
a substantially harmful way. However, if the pattern found here also are evident in less mature de-
mocracies, where levels of political support most often are substantially lower (Norris 2011; Dahl-
berg et al. 2014), a negative long-term effect of losing on support might in fact have negative con-
sequences for the legitimacy of the political system, since a democratic regime in the long-run is 
dependent on the consent of not only political wines but also a substantial share of those ending up 
on the losing side.  
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Appenix 1  
 
TABLE A1.1. COMPARING THE SOM SURVEY AND THE CITIZEN PANEL ON THE VARIABLES USED 
IN THE ANALYSES 
    SOM Citizen Panel 1-8 
Gender Women 53 31 
 
Men 47 69 
Age 18-21 6 0 
 
22-30 10 7 
 
31-40 14 19 
 
41-50 18 21 
 
51-60 18 25 
 
61-70 19 20 
 
<71 15 8 
Education Low 36 7 
 
Medium 30 21 
 
High 34 72 
Employment Yes 58 70 
 
No 45 30 
Political interest Very interested 13 47 
 
Fairly interested 43 46 
 
Not very interested 36 7 
 
Not at all interested 8 0 
Party Choice Left Party 6 14 
 
Social Democratic Party 29 17 
 
Center Party 7 5 
 
Liberal Party 8 11 
 
Moderate Party 32 23 
 
Christian Democratic party 6 7 
 
Green Party 8 15 
 
Sweden Democrats 4 8 
Satisfaction with Democracy Very satisfied 18 19 
 
Fairly satisfied 63 56 
 
Not very satisfied 15 18 
 
Not satisfied at all 4 7 
Trust in Politicians Very high 2 3 
 
Fairly high 47 57 
 
Fairly low 41 31 
 
Very low 10 9 
Left-Right Self-placement Left 31 39 
 
Middle 25 23 
 
Right 44 38 
N:   5000 695 
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Appenix 2  
 
 
TABLE A2.1. THE WINNER LOSER GAP AND SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY (MIXED MODEL) 
 Satisfaction with Democracy Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
(pre-elec inc.) (pre-elec inc.) (pre-elec inc.)   No pre-elec. No pre-elec. No pre-elec. 
Loser -0.502*** -0.330*** -0.222*** 
 
-0.583*** -0.455*** -0.356*** 
 
(0.090) (0.078) (0.074) 
 
(0.057) (0.050) (0.049) 
Time 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.015*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Loser*Time -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
 
0.008 0.008 0.008 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Trust in politicians 
 
0.354*** 0.338*** 
  
0.320*** 0.303*** 
  
(0.025) (0.025) 
  
(0.015) (0.015) 
Left-right extremism 
 
-0.023 -0.035** 
  
-0.002 -0.014 
  
(0.015) (0.015) 
  
(0.009) (0.009) 
Political interest 
 
0.158** 0.108* 
  
0.140*** 0.105*** 
  
(0.064) (0.059) 
  
(0.037) (0.035) 
Gender 
 
-0.018 0.039 
  
0.000 0.051 
  
(0.068) (0.063) 
  
(0.043) (0.041) 
Age 
 
-0.003 -0.002 
  
0.002 0.001 
  
(0.003) (0.002) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Education (eight categories) 
 
0.050** 0.040* 
  
0.059*** 0.045*** 
  
(0.023) (0.021) 
  
(0.014) (0.013) 
Employment (1=employed) 
 
-0.046 -0.017 
  
0.025 0.029 
  
(0.074) (0.068) 
  
(0.044) (0.042) 
Voted for Sweden Democrats 
  
-0.775*** 
   
-0.675*** 
   
(0.119) 
   
(0.072) 
Intercept 3.215*** 1.902*** 1.967*** 
 
3.264*** 1.671*** 1.812*** 
 
(0.063) (0.316) (0.290) 
 
(0.042) (0.190) (0.181) 
var(time) .002 .001 .001   .002 .001 .001 
var(intercept) .294 .184 .147 
 
.352 .222 .200 
cov(time,intercept -.000 -.003 -.003 
 
-.005 -.005 -.006 
var(e) .157 .152 .152 
 
.177 .175 .175 
Log likelihood  -1156.2278 -1070.4778 -1051.1193 
 
-3787.723 -3592.7797 -3550.4797 
        Observations 1,679 1,679 1,679 
 
5,040 5,040 5,040 
Number of groups 194 194 194 
 
639 639 639 
Time points 9 9 9   8 8 8 
 
Source: Election Campaign Panel 2010 & Citizen Panel 2010-2014. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For coding rules, see Table 1. 
 
Models 1-3 are based on data with the pre-election survey included, which gives us nine time-points 
with a balanced panel of 194 respondents. Models 4-6 is the same as in Table 2 and include only 
respondents from the Citizen Panel based on the 639 respondents. Clearly, when comparing mod-
els 1-3 with 4-6, the results are very similar and robust, although the time-component is not signifi-
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cantly different from zero in the low-N study. Figure A2.1 plots the marginal effect of being winner 
or loser on satisfaction with democracy over time. The first graph is based on model 3 in Table 
A2.1 (i.e. using both the pre-election Campaign Panel and the Citizen Panel). The right hand graph 
is the same as in Figure 5, using only the Citizen Panel and thus increasing the number of respond-
ents from 194 to 639.  
 
FIGURE A2.1. MARGINAL EFFECT OF BEING WINNER AND LOSER ON SATISFACTION WITH DE-
MOCRACY OVER TIME  
Pre-election+Citizen Panel Citizen Panel 
  
N: 194: T:9 N: 639: T:8 
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Appenix 3  
 
 
Different coding rules of the seven-point scale (the pre- and post-election 2010 panels) into four 
points and its effect on satisfaction with democracy among electoral winners and losers.  
 
FIGURE A3.1. CODING: (1=1) (2/3=2) (4=.) (5/6=3) (7=4) 
 
FIGURE A3.2. CODING: (1/2=1) (3=2) (4=.) (5=3) (6/7=4) 
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Appendix 4 
 
TABLE A4.1. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS USING DIFFERENT ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES. 
 Satisfaction with Democracy  
OLS (robust) 
Random intercepts 
only 
Random intercepts 
& slopes 
Random inter-
cepts & slopes 
(LDV) 
ML-Ordered Logit 
(GLM) 
Loser -0.309*** -0.359*** -0.356*** -0.303*** -2.099*** 
 
(0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.048) (0.263) 
Time -0.011** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.081*** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.025) 
Loser*Time 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.056* 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.034) 
Trust in politicians 0.554*** 0.327*** 0.303*** 0.317*** 1.790*** 
 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.099) 
Left-right extremism -0.015** -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.083 
 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.052) 
Political interest 0.130*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.089*** 0.497** 
 
(0.016) (0.032) (0.035) (0.032) (0.201) 
Gender 0.054*** 0.050 0.051 0.052 0.318 
 
(0.019) (0.037) (0.041) (0.036) (0.230) 
Age 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.006 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) 
Education (eight categories) 0.032*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.245*** 
 
(0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.073) 
Employment (1=employed) 0.003 0.027 0.029 0.031 0.108 
 
(0.019) (0.038) (0.042) (0.037) (0.236) 
Voted for Sweden Democrats -0.464*** -0.656*** -0.675*** -0.556*** -3.233*** 
 
(0.035) (0.066) (0.072) (0.066) (0.413) 
Satisfaction with Democracy t-1 - - - 0.107*** - 
 - - - (0.014) - 
Intercept 1.165*** 1.759*** 1.812*** 1.465*** - 
 
(0.096) (0.166) (0.181) (0.166) - 
R2 .45 .46 - - 639 
Observations 5,040 5,040 5,040 4,378 5,040 
Number of groups (639) 639 639 639 639 
 
